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SAVING LAW REVIEWS FROM POLITICAL SCIENTISTS: A DEFENSE OF 
LAWYERS, LAW PROFESSORS, AND LAW REVIEWS 
Benjamin H. Barton1 
This essay reviews Robert J. Spitzer, Saving the Constitution from Lawyers: How Legal 
Training and Law Reviews Distort Constitutional Meaning, and argues that it fails on 
two fronts. First, I offer a defense of lawyers, law professors, and law reviews. Second, I 
show that Spitzer's own book proves that peer-reviewed political science scholarship 
suffers from at least as many faults and foibles as law review scholarship. 
 
For example, in each of his three examples of wayward theorizing Spitzer insists that his 
reading of the Constitution and its history is so clearly correct that his opponents' 
scholarship is not only wrong on the merits, but is so bad that it is affirmatively 
dangerous and never should have been published. The efficacy of these arguments is 
crippled, however, by claim that the individual rights theory of the Second Amendment is 
fatally, obviously, and laughably wrong as a matter of constitutional theory, case law, 
and history. Unfortunately for Spitzer the Supreme Court held the exact opposite by a 
vote of 9-0 in District of Columbia v. Heller months after the publication of the book. 
 
Further, Spitzer presents a remarkably weak case of causation between his alleged faulty 
scholarship and any resulting governmental actions. Even if Spitzer is correct that the 
scholarship he highlights is fatally wrong, it is quite a leap to say that this scholarship 
caused executive branch actions like George W. Bush's claim of expansive executive 
powers after 9/11 or George H.W. Bush's claim of an inherent line item veto. 
 
SAVING THE CONSTITUTION FROM LAWYERS: HOW LEGAL TRAINING AND LAW REVIEWS 
DISTORT CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING.  By Robert J. Spitzer.  New York: Cambridge 
University Press.  2008.  Pp. ix, 195.  $85.00. 
 
Robert J. Spitzer is one of America’s best known Political Scientists.  He’s 
written over three hundred articles and multiple highly influential books.  He’s been 
repeatedly honored for his work and has been a leader in the American Political Science 
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  Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law.  B.A. 1991, Haverford College; 
J.D. 1996, University of Michigan.  The author gives special thanks to Indya Kincannon, Jeff Hirsch, 
Jennifer Hendricks, Helen Hershkoff, Glenn Reynolds, and the University of Tennessee College of Law for 
generous research support, and the Honorable Diana Gribbon Motz. 
Association, the premier American political science organization.2  When Robert Spitzer 
writes a book published by the Cambridge University Press that argues that legal training 
and law reviews gravely “distort” the Constitution itself and concludes that the 
Constitution thus needs “saving” from lawyers, the claim is serious enough to require a 
response. 
Spitzer’s argument relies upon three central criticisms of American lawyers and 
law professors.  First, Spitzer suggests that lawyers are congenitally disposed to ignore 
the truth in favor of their clients’ selfish interests.  Second, Spitzer argues that law 
professors are ill suited to analyze the Constitution (and maybe law as a whole) because 
they are trained as lawyers/advocates, rather than in the more neutral scientific method 
(like political scientists).  Last, Spitzer asserts that student-edited law reviews compound 
the above errors by publishing law professors’ facially erroneous Constitutional 
interpretations.  These inaccurate interpretations are then used to distort and subvert 
constitutional meaning. 
Any law professor who has stood still in front political scientist or an economist 
will recognize these three criticisms, and Spitzer himself makes no claim that they are 
particularly original.3  Spitzer’s most original claim is that the combination of law 
professors disinclined to seek, or incapable of seeking, the truth in their scholarship with 
poorly edited student law reviews results in dangerous scholarship that does affirmative 
harm to the constitution, and the heart of the book is Spitzer’s three examples of 
“wayward constitutional theorizing.”  On the surface I quite like this argument: it is 
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  ROBERT J. SPITZER, SAVING THE CONSTITUTION FROM LAWYERS: HOW LEGAL TRAINING AND LAW 
REVIEWS DISTORT CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 187-88 (2008). 
3
  For example, Spitzer himself notes multiple earlier commentaries on the difference between a lawyer’s 
approach to a problem and a scientist’s, see SPITZER, supra note __, at 22-25, and the vast volume of 
criticism of student-run law reviews.  See ID. at 46-58. 
simple and bold and attempts to connect three common criticisms into a much larger 
indictment of American constitutional theorizing.4 
Nevertheless, after reading the book several times I conclude that both the 
underlying criticisms and Spitzer’s examples do not add up to much.  This review seeks 
to debunk Spitzer’s contention on two fronts.  First, I offer a defense of lawyers, law 
professors, and law reviews.  Second, I show that Spitzer’s own book proves that peer-
reviewed political science scholarship suffers from at least as many faults and foibles as 
law review scholarship.   
For example, in each of his three examples of wayward theorizing Spitzer insists 
that his reading of the Constitution and its history is so clearly correct that his opponents’ 
scholarship is not only wrong on the merits, but is so bad that it is affirmatively 
dangerous and never should have been published.  The efficacy of these arguments is 
crippled, however, by Spitzer’s third example, the Second Amendment.  Spitzer claims 
that the individual rights theory of the second amendment is fatally, obviously, and 
laughably wrong, both as a matter of constitutional theory, case law and history.5  
Unfortunately for Spitzer the Supreme Court held the exact opposite by a vote of 9-0 in 
District of Columbia v. Heller6 months after the publication of the book.   
Further, Spitzer presents a remarkably weak case of causation between his alleged 
faulty scholarship and any resulting governmental actions.  Even if Spitzer is correct that 
the scholarship he highlights is fatally wrong, it is quite a leap to say that this scholarship 
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  Over the years I have been known to use narrower criticisms of the legal profession as an explanation for 
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the Legal Profession?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 1-55 (2007); Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of 
Lawyer Regulation – Who Should Control Lawyer Regulation, Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 
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5
  SPITZER, supra note __, at 129-76. 
6
 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008). 
caused executive branch actions like George W. Bush’s claim of expansive executive 
powers after 9/11 or George H.W. bush’s claim of an inherent line item veto. 
Part I describes Spitzer’s argument more fully.  Part II argues that Spitzer’s 
criticisms of lawyers, law professors and law reviews are wrong in important ways that 
undermine his thesis.  Part III then demonstrates how Spitzer’s own examples show the 
failings of his arguments with particular clarity. 
I. The Argument in Brief 
Spitzer’s argument consists of three parts.  The first two chapters lay out the dual 
theoretical underpinnings of the book: Chapter One argues that by training and nature 
lawyers and law professors don’t care about the truth, only advocating a position, and 
Chapter Two notes that student-edited law reviews compound this problems.  The last 
part of the argument stretches across chapters 3-5, where Spitzer lays out three examples 
of poor law review scholarship harming the Constitution itself.  This Part describes each 
of these elements of the book in turn. 
A. Lawyers and Law Professors are Trained Liars? 
 I add the question mark to the heading above as an homage to the first subpart of 
Spitzer’s book, which is titled “Lawyers as Liars?”7  Spitzer does includes a question 
mark after this phrase and even concludes the Chapter by proclaiming law an “honorable, 
noble and – above all – necessary profession.”8  Yet, the great bulk of Chapter One’s 
treatment of lawyers and the advocacy system leaves little question how Spitzer would 
answer the questions presented above.  Spitzer focuses on law as gladiatorial combat 
between zealous advocates with little incentive or willingness to present or speak the 
                                                 
7
  SPITZER, supra note __ at 11. 
8
  SPITZER, supra note __ at 31. In another spot Spitzer likewise expresses his support for the American 
adversary system.  SPITZER, supra note __ at 22. 
truth.  He quotes others to the effect that the “tenets of the legal profession often 
‘encourages or even requires outright lying’”9 and the “gladiator using the weapons in the 
courtroom is not primarily crusading after truth, but seeking to win.”10   
According to Spitzer this indifference to truth starts in law school, and is drilled 
home in practice.  Lawyers, law students, and law professors are taught to doubt 
objective material truth and to separate morals from law.  The natural result of law 
school, legal practice, and the adversary system is advocates who don’t care about the 
truth of the matter, and serve only the narrow interests of their clients, not truth or 
broader morality. 
The irony of this account of the legal profession is that while Spitzer admits that 
his version of the legal system may shock readers who find it “draconian or even 
immoral,”11 he eventually concludes with a defense of lawyers, law schools, and the 
advocacy system.12  This is because Spitzer’s actual target is not lawyers or the legal 
profession, but law professors.  The entire point of the description of the immoral 
advocacy system and the congenital liars who inhabit it is to tar the majority of law 
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  SPITZER, supra note __ at 12 (quoting Michael Kinsley, “Why Lawyers are Liars,” SLATE MAGAZINE, 
January 20, available at http://www.slate.com/id/2134510/. 
10
 SPITZER, supra note __ at 20 (quoting Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 
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Spitzer calls both Justices Alito and Roberts liars based on their confirmation testimony, because as 
lawyers “it was allowable for them to lie to their client regarding what they really thought about Roe 
because they knew that their client, Ronald Reagan, opposed Roe.”  On page 18 he states the traditional 
defense of the advocacy system as a truth seeking process, but then argues that “[t]ruth to tell, the advocacy 
system in operation tends to serve the objective of resolving disputes rather than searching for material 
truth.”  On p. 19 he states that lawyers “may encourage a fact-finder to reach a wrong conclusion by . . . 
knowingly presenting perjured testimony or cross-examining truthful witnesses in a manner that undercuts 
their credibility.”  On pp. 21-22 Spitzer describes Oliver Wendell Holmes’ distinction between law and 
morals, points out the “moral ruthlessness” of lawyers and concludes that “[t]o some readers, this account 
of the advocacy process and other aspects of legal education might seem draconian or even immoral.”  On 
p. 23 he notes that lawyers are “skeptical about, if not indifferent to, the notion of objective truth.”     
11
 SPITZER, supra note __ at 22. 
12
 SPITZER, supra note __ at 14, 22, 31, 32. 
professors whose only training is in law school, and whose only experience is as lawyers, 
rather than a proper scholarly training in a PhD program.13  Scholarly inquiry is always 
devoted to the search for truth, with no preconceived notions or specific answers in mind.  
Spitzer notes that legal training and the practice of law are thus particularly ill-suited as 
precursors to a life as a scholar.  In contrast to all other PhD trained faculty, they have no 
training in the “rules of inquiry” that govern research in the hard and social sciences.  
This adds up to the bugaboo of “advocacy scholarship” in law schools, where law 
professors come to a conclusion first, and then gather supporting arguments second.14  
It’s worth noting, however, that from the title of the book to the bulk of the 
material in Chapter One Spitzer is attempting a sleight of hand.  Spitzer promises us an 
argument for “Saving the Constitution from Lawyers” and that he will explain “How 
Legal Training and Law Reviews Distort Constitutional Meaning.”  The book is frankly 
silent on the first of these points.  At the absolute maximum Spitzer provides an argument 
against the constitutional theorizing of law professors that appears in law reviews.  The 
book spends little time on the actual arguments that lawyers put forth in court in 
constitutional cases.  Spitzer never argues that it’s wrong for a lawyer to advocate 
zealously on behalf of her client.  Nor does he argue that any particular constitutional 
analysis by lawyers is bad or wrong.  To the contrary, Spitzer is worried about academic 
legal writing in law reviews and its propensity towards “the cultivation of wayward 
constitutional theorizing.”15  When he discusses the theorizing that lawyers do to win 
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  SPITZER, supra note __ at 29-30. 
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cases he seems positively sanguine.16  I suppose that “Saving the Constitution from Law 
Professors and Law Reviews” would have been a much less catchy title, but it would 
have been vastly more accurate. 
B. Law Reviews Make It Worse 
In Chapter Two Spitzer argues that the flaws in the student-run law review system 
magnify the problems with the law professoriate exponentially.  It begins with a short 
history of the law review system and a description of how it currently operates.   
Spitzer’s basic attitude towards student-edited law reviews can be easily summed 
up: “To the contemporary academic world, the decision to allow students to create and 
run an academic publication, especially at a flagship university, might seem puzzling, 
even inexplicable.”17  By comparison, most other academic disciplines use the “gold 
standard” if peer review, rather than student-editing.18  This inexplicable situation has 
multiple problematic results, and anyone who’s familiar with the anti-law review 
literature will recognize them.  There are too many law reviews.19  Law review writing 
suffers from excess “length, redundancy, and footnoting.”20  More worrisome is that law 
students are not experts in what they publish, and therefore choose to publish poor, 
biased, or incorrect scholarship.21 
Spitzer does recognize that as a historical matter law reviews used to publish 
articles that were more practitioner-oriented, and that students are better situated to 
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  “In fact, I side with defenders of the American system of justice. But I also believe that its traits have 
other, adverse consequences when removed from the practice of law.”  (p. 22) (emphasis added). 
17
 SPITZER, supra note __ at 38.  One of the more humorous repeated ticks in the book is the use of 
conditional phrases like “might seem” and the possible opinions of third parties, like the “contemporary 
academic world,” to soften harsh critiques and to suggest that while Spitzer raises them, he would not want 
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  SPITZER, supra note __ at 49. 
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  SPITZER, supra note __ at 41-42. 
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  SPITZER, supra note __ at 56-57. 
21
  SPITZER, supra note __ at 53-55. 
review and edit that type of scholarship.22  Like Spitzer’s late defense of the advantages 
of the advocacy system and law school training for lawyers, Spitzer offers a limp 
description of the advantages of the law review system noting that “law reviews publish 
many excellent articles,”23 that they are a good educational experience for the students,24 
and that Spitzer himself has published in law reviews.25  Spitzer likewise recognizes that 
peer-review can result in demonstrably incorrect scholarship, citing the plagiarism 
charges against Stephen Ambrose and Doris Kearns Goodwin and the 
fabricated/misrepresented evidence used by Michael Bellesiles and John Lott.26  
Nevertheless, Spitzer concludes quite firmly that peer review is demonstrably superior to 
student-editing, and that the problems with student-editing provide “a uniquely wide and 
fertile opportunity for the cultivation and propagation of wayward constitutional 
theories.”27 
C.  Three Case Studies of Harmful, “Wayward Constitutional Theories”  
Chapters Three, Four and Five are the heart of Spitzer’s book and its most 
original contribution.  Spitzer argues that the combination of ill-trained law 
professors/advocates writing in student-run law reviews has resulted in dangerously 
wrong scholarship that has later created bad public policy or even erroneous judicial 
decisions.  If Spitzer is right that law training and law reviews “distort” constitutional 
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  SPITZER, supra note __ at 59. 
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 SPITZER, supra note __ at 48. 
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 SPITZER, supra note __ at 4 & n. 10. 
26
 SPITZER, supra note __ at 51-52. 
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 SPITZER, supra note __ at 59.  It’s worth noting here that Spitzer’s criticisms of lawyers, law professors, 
and law reviews are all pretty standard stuff.  He cites appropriately to the main prior sources of these 
critiques, but the really original analysis is the claim that these criticisms add up to actual harm to the 
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publish “mind-numbing” and repetitive prose “that serves no other purpose than to duplicate what has 
already been published.” SPITZER, supra note __ at 56-57. 
meaning Spitzer has greatly raised the stakes on the somewhat well-worn complaints in 
Chapters One and Two of the book.   
Spitzer notes three different problematic constitutional interpretations that he 
claims arose as a result of poor scholarship: the idea of a constitutionally inherent line-
item veto, as suggested in the presidency of George H.W. Bush (Chapter 3), the strong 
unified executive theory claimed by George W. Bush following 9/11 (Chapter 4), and the 
“individual right” theory of the Second Amendment (Chapter 5).   
Each chapter follows the same basic pattern.  Spitzer begins each by laying out 
what he considers a deeply erroneous constitutional argument that nevertheless received 
support in law review articles.  He notes that the governmental actors involved relied 
upon faulty scholarship as support for their poor decisions.  He then lays out, in great 
detail, why he disagrees with the argument, usually relying on a battle over the historical 
record at the time of the Founders and/or case law.  Spitzer then uses each of these 
examples to prove that poor law review scholarship has thus wrought serious harm upon 
the Constitution itself.    
The book closes in Chapter 6 with some possible solutions to the problem that 
Spitzer identifies.  These solutions include making law school look more like graduate 
school in political science, making law reviews look more like traditional peer-reviewed 
publications, and limiting the scope of legal academic scholarship to more traditional 
legal analysis. 
II. Lawyers, Law Professors, and Law Students 
Spitzer’s argument relies on three key critiques of lawyers, law professors, and 
law reviews, each of which is quite problematic.   
A. Lawyers as Liars 
Spitzer provides the first leg of the defense himself: he admits to being a 
supporter of the adversary system, the role of lawyers in that system, and the training 
lawyers receive as a precursor to operating in that system.  Thus, Spitzer himself 
concedes that the Constitution needs no saving from lawyers operating as lawyers.28  To 
the contrary, constitutional interpretation by lawyers in legal cases is obviously advocacy 
on the part of their client, and to be viewed as such.  
Moreover, Spitzer’s basic point – that lawyers are congenitally pre-disposed to 
bend the truth or outright lie – is overblown and hardly reflects the reality of law practice 
or law school.  First, Spitzer is a political scientist, so he should certainly understand that 
lawyers, like politicians, are often called upon to put the best face on unfortunate 
circumstances.  As any marginally decent lawyer (or politician) will report, outright lying 
or evasion is rarely, if ever, the most effective strategy.29  To the contrary, lawyers who 
are interested in serving their clients and winning do their very best to massage the facts 
and present the best possible case they can, consistent with both the good and bad facts.30  
One of the oddities about Spitzer’s book is his naïve insistence on a single, 
absolute truth, both in matters of constitutional interpretation and in lawsuits.  In 
Spitzer’s world, one side to a lawsuit must be “lying,” because there is an objective truth 
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  “In fact, I side with defenders of the American system of justice.  But I also believe that its traits have 
other, adverse consequences when removed from the practice of law.”  SPITZER, supra note __ at 22 
(emphasis added).  See also SPITZER, supra note __ at 31 (“Yet, my argument is that lawyers are well 
equipped by the principles and training of their discipline to function within the professional world for 
which they are prepared but are poorly equipped to engage in the scholarly world as it pertains to 
constitutional scholarship.”).  
29
  Just ask Presidents Nixon and Clinton about how lying/evading worked out for them. 
30
  Cf. L. TIMOTHY PERRIN ET AL., THE ART & SCIENCE OF TRIAL ADVOCACY 1-6 (2003) (“Trial lawyers’ 
successes come from hard work and attention to the details; from the advocate’s sincerity and authenticity; 
from facts marshaled and presented in such a way that they appeal to both logic and emotion; and from a 
cause or a principle that the jurors will claim as their own.”); DOUGLAS S. LAVINE, CARDINAL RULES OF 
ADVOCACY 31-45 (2002) (noting that all good advocacy is “honest and respectful”). 
to be discovered and only one side’s story can be true.31  In lawsuits, as in life, there are 
two sides to every story.  Witnesses naturally remember and shade events differently, 
often to their own benefit.  The adversarial system is not capable of, or aimed to, discover 
the absolute truth of past events.  No human system can accomplish that.  To the 
contrary, the adversary system lets each side tell their story and then allows fallible 
decision-makers (either judges or juries) to choose whom to believe. 
Moreover, it is flatly incorrect to say that law schools train lawyers to disregard 
the truth.  To the contrary, since the 1970s law schools have added layer upon layer of 
legal ethics training.32  Law schools do train students that law is often indeterminate (i.e. 
there is not necessarily a single clear answer to every legal question),33 but law schools 
rarely tell students anything about the truth or falsity of the facts in the cases they study. 
B. Law Professors as Incompetents 
Spitzer’s critique of law professors, however, cuts closer to the bone.  It is 
certainly true that the bulk of American law professors (this author included) have no 
additional graduate degrees beyond a JD or other law related degree.  It is also true that 
the pursuit of a JD in law school is quite different from the pursuit of a PhD in the social 
sciences.   
Spitzer’s critique does a nice job of highlighting the hybrid nature of the law 
professoriate.  On the one hand, unlike political scientists, law professors serve a critical 
pre-professional function of training lawyers for the practice of law.  Given that student 
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  See SPITZER, supra note __ at 23 (noting that lawyers are skeptical or indifferent to “objective truth”).  
Further, Spitzer’s repeated descriptions of perjured or knowingly misleading arguments makes it seem like 
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  See Stephen Gillers, Eat Your Spinach?, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1215, 1218 (2007). 
33
  I have called this aspect of law school “the siren song of indeterminacy.” Benjamin H. Barton, The 
Emperor of Ocean Park: The Quintessence of Legal Academia, 92 CAL. L. REV. 585, 593-95 (2004). 
tuition supplies the great bulk of the revenue supporting law schools, and the important 
role that lawyers play in the functioning of our government and democracy, the need for 
satisfactory teaching of law students is absolutely critical.  In short, most, if not all, law 
professors should be able to teach the practice of law, which likely requires that they have 
attended law school and had some experience as lawyers. 
On the other hand law professors are also required to publish scholarship,34 and as 
Spitzer points out, contemporary law professors often publish articles directly utilizing 
the tools and approaches of other academic disciplines.35  Often these law professors do 
not hold advanced degrees in these disciplines, and may not have been trained at all in 
those disciplines.36  It may, in fact, be true that law professors should think twice before 
writing in these areas, and it may also be true that law reviews should be cautious about 
publishing “law and” scholarship from scholars without the requisite backgrounds or 
bona fides. 
That said, Spitzer misses a key fact about lawyers and law professors.  The job of 
a lawyer invariably involves “law and,” as a lawyer’s practice always involves some 
outside activity, from medical practice, to construction, to banking, plus the governing 
law.  If one speaks to a medical malpractice lawyer, she will tell you that she often feels 
like she understands the procedures at issue in her cases batter than the doctors she 
deposes.  Similarly, legal standards and cases are not ever solely about the law, so the 
study of an area of the law necessarily requires outside expertise.  Antitrust scholars must 
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  The ABA accreditation standards require, among many other things, a faculty engaged in scholarly 
research and writing.  See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS 
AND INTERPRETATIONS §§ 401-402, at 
http://www.abanet.org/legaled/standards/20082009StandardsWebContent/Chapter%204.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 1, 2008). 
35
 SPITZER, supra note __ at 42. 
36
 SPITZER, supra note __ at 15. 
understand economics.  Securities regulations scholars must understand stock offerings.  
The study of law, like the job of the law professor, naturally involves a breadth of 
knowledge and expertise in areas outside of law.  Law professors, like lawyers, are often 
forced to pick up this expertise on the fly.  In many cases this has worked out quite 
nicely.37  It’s also worth noting that Spitzer’s biggest beef is with the historical research 
of various law professors on constitutional issues, and Spitzer himself is not a trained 
historian.38  
Moreover, it would be impossible for law professors to teach or write about 
Constitutional law without delving into the underlying history of the Constitution.  This is 
so because the Supreme Court has regularly relied upon historical antecedents 
(particularly from the time of the founders) in analyzing the Constitution.  As such, both 
practicing lawyers and law professors are continually required to comb the historical 
record.  Whether or not courts and lawyers are good at exploring the historical record, 
and whether the Supreme Court should try to avoid basing decisions upon difficult and 
spotty historical records, are different questions.  The fact remains that in these 
circumstances lawyers and judges must explore the historical record to decide what the 
“right” answer is based upon history.  In this regard, law professors are doing no more or 
less than courts have required of them.  
Lastly, Spitzer is actually too circumspect in only suggesting that poorly trained 
law professors should decline to write about constitutional interpretation.  Given that it’s 
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  Richard Posner, the progenitor of law and economics, is not a formally trained economist.  Richard 
Posner Bio, http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/posner-r/.  Lawrence Friedman, author of the seminal 
American legal history text, is not a trained historian.  James M. Friedman Bio, 
http://www.law.stanford.edu/directory/profile/23/.  Lawrence Lessig does not have a degree in computer 
science.  Lawrence Lessig Bio, http://www.lessig.org/info/bio/. 
38
  Robert Spitzer Bio, http://www.cortland.edu/polsci/default.asp?page_id=19.  Nor does he have a law 
degree.  See id. 
true that most law professors were trained in law school instead of another PhD program 
and assuming that renders them poorly trained for true scholarly inquiry and inevitably 
prone to flawed “advocacy” scholarship published by unwitting student-run law reviews, 
shouldn’t we be dubious of all legal scholarship?  If there are examples of “wacky” or 
“bizarre” scholarship outside of constitutional law that have had deleterious effects, they 
would greatly strengthen Spitzer’s thesis.  If there are no such examples that would 
naturally undercut the thesis. 
 C.  Law Reviews  
Spitzer himself recognizes that much law review scholarship is good,39 and there 
is a certain irony that so many of the sources he uses to buttress his critique of the legal 
profession, law professors and law reviews come from law reviews and/or law professors 
themselves.  For example, Chapter One’s critique of the adversary system rightly cites 
and quotes many of the foundational works,40 including influential commentaries by law 
professors Stephen Gillers,41 Monroe Freedman,42 Deborah Rhode,43 Geoffrey Hazard,44 
Marvin Frankel,45 and David Luban.46  Likewise, both Spitzer’s argument about the 
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 SPITZER, supra note __ at 59. 
40
 SPITZER, supra note __ at 18-22. 
41
  Spitzer quotes and cites Stephen Gillers, The American Legal Profession, in FUNDAMENTALS OF 
AMERICAN LAW (Alan B. Morrison, ed. 1996) on pp. 18-19 & nn. 30 & 32. 
42
  Spitzer quotes and cites MONROE FREEDMAN, LAWYERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1975) on 
pp. 19-22 & nn. 31, 39, 43, 53. 
43
  Spitzer paraphrases and cites Deborah Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STANFORD L. 
REV. 604 (1985) on p. 20 & n. 37. 
44
  Spitzer quotes and cites GEOFFREY HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (1978) on p. 20 & n. 36. 
45
  Marvin Frankel was a law professor at Columbia and a federal judge.  See Steven Greenhouse, Marvin 
Frankel, Federal Judge and Pioneer of Sentencing Guidelines, Dies at 81, N.Y. TIMES March 5, 2002, at 
A17.  Spitzer quotes and cites Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 Penn. L. 
Rev. 1035 (1975) on pp. 18 & 20-21nn. 29, 41, 44, as well as MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 
(1980) on pp. 18, 22-23 & nn. 35, 53, 55.  
46
  Spitzer quotes and cites David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS’ 
ROLES AND LAWYERS’ ETHICS (David Luban, ed. 1983) on pp. 20, 22 & n. 42, 51 and DAVID LUBAN, 
LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988) on pp. 22, 24 & nn. 53, 61.   
 
insufficiency and inappropriateness of legal training for scholarly work and the evils of 
student run law reviews rely heavily on influential works, often in law reviews, by law 
professors.47 
Again, Spitzer presents many fair critiques of the law review system.  There are 
probably too many law reviews, and it is true that some bad scholarship is published 
every year.  It’s also true that law review articles tend to be too long, and are in some 
cases poorly written.48 
Nevertheless, Spitzer’s argument does not rest upon stylistic concerns.  Spitzer 
needs to prove that student-edited law reviews are more likely to publish biased or flatly 
incorrect scholarship than peer-reviewed journals.  On this front, I do not think he carries 
the day. 
Most importantly, I do not think law reviews are more likely to publish false 
information.  To the contrary, I think they are less likely to.  Anyone who has published 
with an American law review knows that there is one thing that students excel at, often to 
the great consternation of authors: cite checking.  Students ask that almost every 
proposition have a cite, and then they check each and every cite within an article to make 
                                                                                                                                                 
Chapter One’s discussion would have been enriched by including WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF 
JUSTICE (1998) and MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS (1994), two of the absolute best 
books in this area.  Glendon is cited later in the discussion of “advocacy scholarship.” SPITZER, supra note 
__ at 30 & nn. 85-86. 
47
  On the inability of law professors to write true scholarship Spitzer quotes and cites law professors 
(among others) Anthony Kronman, Arthur Miller, and Lee Epstein (with co-author and political scientist 
Gary King).  See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
(1993) cited and quoted on p. 23 & n. 56; Arthur S. Miller, The Myth of Objectivity in Legal Research and 
Writing, 18 CATH. U. LAW REV. 291 (1969) cited and quoted on p. 24 & nn. 58-59; Lee Epstein & Gary 
King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 9 (2002) cited and quoted on pp. 25, 29 & nn. 64, 80-82; 
Lee Epstein & Gary King, A Reply, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 194 (2002) cited and quoted on p. 30 & n. 84.  On 
the various problems with student-edited law reviews Spitzer cites (among others) law professors James 
Lindgren, Bernard Hibbitts, Lawrence Friedman, Richard Posner, Fred Rodell, and Robert Stevens on pp. 
33-49 & nn. 2-74. 
48
  I have not read as many peer reviewed poli sci journals as I have law reviews, but I have read enough to 
know that stilted or repetitive writing and articles that add incrementally, if at all, to the existing literature 
are not a unique problem to law reviews. 
sure it matches the proposition.  By contrast peer-reviewed journals generally rely upon 
their authors to verify the accuracy of their footnotes and propositions.49  This means that 
at a minimum whatever an author says in the text that is followed by a footnote is 
extremely likely to be true, and that the reliance upon fabricated evidence that occurred in 
some famous peer-reviewed work would have been impossible in a law review. 
Spitzer also claims that student-edited law reviews are more likely to publish 
slanted or biased scholarship (advocacy scholarship).  As an initial matter I’ll note that 
Spitzer’s own book is hardly a paragon of neutrality.  He calls Justices Alito and Roberts 
liars,50 accuses John Ashcroft of “shocking incompetence”51 and chooses as its examples 
of “wayward” or “bizarre” constitutional thinking only actions during the presidencies of 
George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush, when Bill Clinton certainly pushed the legal 
envelope during his last years in office.52  This selection of issues, and the description of 
the Second Amendment issue as an open and shut case certainly raise the question of 
whether Spitzer’s own book suffers from bias.  I will also note that Spitzer is not alone, 
and truly unbiased scholarship in the social sciences is relatively hard to come by.53 
                                                 
49
  I have published in a peer-reviewed journal, Benjamin H. Barton, Is There a Correlation Between Law 
Professor Publication Counts, Law Review Citation Counts, and Teaching Evaluations? An Empirical 
Study, 5 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 618 (2008), and am on the Board of Edirots of The Clinical Law Review, a 
peer-reviewed journal, and it is certainly not true that peer reviewed publications sweat the footnotes the 
way that student-edited law reviews do.  Cf. Max Schanzenbach, Peer-Reviewed versus Student-Edited 
Journals, EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES BLOG, 
http://www.elsblog.org/the_empirical_legal_studi/2006/02/peerreviewed_ve.html (noting the cite checking 
advantage for student run law reviews).  So, some of the most famous examples of fabricated research in 
peer-reviewed journals would have been impossible in a student-edited journal, because the students check 
each and every source carefully. 
50
  SPITZER, supra note __ at 12-13. 
51
 SPITZER, supra note __ at 170. 
52
  Cf. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 705-06 (1997) (holding unanimously that sitting presidents generally 
are not entitled to immunity from civil lawsuits based on their unofficial misconduct); Jonathan L. Entin, 
Executive Privilege and Interbranch Comity After Clinton, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 657 (2000) 
(describing various Clinton strategies to expand executive privilege). 
53
  Like our disagreement over the “truth” and “lies” at trial, this is an area where Spitzer and I simply 
disagree.  Writing is by its nature persuasive, and in one form or another bias is natural.  This is one of the 
Spitzer also notes that student editors can allow undeserved authorial hyperbole 
about the importance of their work.54  Given that Spitzer’s own book title claims to save 
the Constitution from lawyers, while actually addressing the malignant force of law 
review articles, I will let this claim speak for itself.  Hyperbole may be distasteful, but 
hardly a danger to the Constitution.  
Lastly, Spitzer notes that student editors may not force an author to include 
outside materials that disprove the author’s thesis.  This is a legitimate worry.  Student 
editors do a masterful job of making sure everything the author cites is true, but they may 
be underequipped to know when some other source or author’s work should be included.  
This is where the overabundance of law reviews is actually a benefit.  With the sheer 
volume of published information it is extremely unlikely that a controversial and wrong 
idea that draws any attention will stay unrebutted for long.   
The three examples Spitzer offers are instructive on this point.  In each case there 
were multiple law review articles (as well as books and peer-reviewed articles) on both 
sides of the issue,55 and whether or not Spitzer thought some were clearly wrong and 
others were clearly right, system-wide the information was there for readers, policy-
makers and judges to make their own call on the issues.56 
III. Spitzer’s Three Examples 
                                                                                                                                                 
reasons why much law scholarship has drifted towards empirical work, although empirical work can 
certainly suffer from biases as well. 
54
 SPITZER, supra note __ at 1-3. 
55
  Spitzer cites to these articles throughout the footnotes of Chapters 3-5, and the sheer volume of cited 
material makes clear that whatever else can be said about these debates there certainly was a full and open 
debate where everyone (including Spitzer) had a chance to state their case. 
56
 For Spitzer’s thesis to hold it is not enough that some law review articles he disagreed with were 
published, it’s necessary that these articles were so invidious that they harmed the Constitution itself.  If the 
ideas were given a full airing though, it’s hard to see how the harm (if indeed there is harm) can be imputed 
to the law review system or the law professoriate. 
 As noted above the first two parts of Spitzer’s book present relatively well worn 
criticisms of law professors and law reviews.  It’s Spitzer’s three examples and his theory 
that law professors and law reviews combine to endanger the Constitution that is his 
unique contribution.  Nevertheless, Spitzer’s three examples have two main flaws.  The 
first is Spitzer’s insistence that the history underlying parts of the Constitution is so clear 
that the arguments he debunks are not only wrong, but wrong enough that they never 
should have been published and are, in fact, dangerous to the Constitution.  The second is 
Spitzer’s weak case for causation.  While the proposed government actions that Spitzer 
derides were partially supported by law review articles, it’s very dubious the law reviews 
actually caused anything.  To the contrary, the government actions at issue would have 
occurred with or without academic support.  The scholarly support was, at best, a gloss 
on decisions already made. 
 A. The Fallacy of Constitutional Correctness 
As I’ve noted above Spitzer seems surprisingly earnest for a Political Scientist.  In 
each of his three areas of constitutional inquiry Spitzer seems utterly convinced that there 
is a single right and wrong answer to the issue at hand, and that those who disagree with 
him should simply be shamed into silence by the sheer force of his arguments.  
Nevertheless, any historian of constitutional theory will note that changes (both large and 
small) within constitutional law were attributable as much (or more) to changes in 
Supreme Court personnel and national preferences than to any claim to the “correctness” 
of the underlying constitutional theory or history.  Spitzer forgets that the history of 
constitutional law is written by the winners, not by law professors or political scientists.  
Constitutional “correctness” is never set in stone, it’s played out over years of decisions 
across differently assembled Courts. 
Spitzer’s last example, the individualist view of the Second Amendment, makes 
this weakness particularly clear.57  Spitzer calls the individualist view “stunningly and 
fatally defective,”58 “erroneous” and “nonsensical,”59 “startling,”60 rife with “obvious 
problems,”61 “wayward,”62 and based upon an “imaginary past.”63  He makes repeated 
sweeping and unequivocal statements like “[n]othing in the history, construction, or 
interpretation of the amendment applies or infers [an individual right].”64   
He ravages the historical arguments for the individualist view.  He then reviews 
the Supreme Court’s pre-2008 Second Amendment case law and concludes that the cases 
are crystal clear in meaning, and all unquestionably support a collective rights 
interpretation.  Spitzer doesn’t stop there though.  He argues that the Supreme Court’s 
various denials of cert. over the last years also signal the “inescapable conclusion . . . that 
the Supreme Court simply has no inclination to revisit the issue.”65  In other words, 
                                                 
57
  The “individualist view” of the Second Amendment argues that “the ownership of firearms is a 
constitutionally based protection that applies to all individuals, without any attachment to militias or the 
government, just as free speech and the right to counsel apply to all individuals.”  SPITZER, supra note __ at 
145.  For a succinct and prescient discussion of the individualist view, see Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Gun by 
Gun, LEGAL AFFAIRS, May/June 2002, http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/May-June-
2002/scene_reynolds_mayjun2002.msp.  Spitzer proscribes (quite vociferously) to the “collective rights” 
theory, which posits that the Second Amendment only guarantees state militia rights and “the Second 
Amendment provides no protection for personal weapons use, including hunting, sporting, collecting, or 
even personal self-protection.”  SPITZER, supra note __ at 133. 
58
  SPITZER, supra note __ at 133. 
59
  SPITZER, supra note __ at 134. 
60
  SPITZER, supra note __ at 150. 
61
  SPITZER, supra note __ at 162. 
62
  SPITZER, supra note __ at 175. 
63
  SPITZER, supra note __ at 176. 
64
  SPITZER, supra note __ at 148. 
65
  SPITZER, supra note __ at 159.  See also SPITZER, supra note __ at 143 (“The inescable conclusion is 
that the  
Spitzer argues that the current Supreme Court is against the individualist view of the 
Second Amendment.66    
The timing of Spitzer’s book is, in this regard, quite unfortunate for Spitzer.  The 
Supreme Court essentially fully adopted the individual rights argument in District of 
Columbia v. Heller67 this summer, just months after publication of Spitzer’s book.  In 
fact, while Heller was a 5-4 decision, it was unanimous on the underlying constitutional 
theory: all nine Justices recognized some form of the individual rights theory of the 
Second Amendment.68  Spitzer’s book spends forty-seven pages rejecting this same 
constitutional theory as clearly, laughably, foolishly incorrect. 
Given my general disregard for expansive claims of obvious constitutional 
correctness I am hesitant to criticize Spitzer too much for his Second Amendment 
chapter.  If a different group of Justices decided Heller in a different time they might well 
agree with Spitzer.  Nevertheless, Spitzer has written a book that argues that the 
supporters of the individualist right theory are not only wrong, they are so wrong that 
their scholarship never should have been published and their work is dangerous.  In this 
circumstance it seems perfectly appropriate to point out that Heller’s unanimous 
                                                 
66
  SPITZER, supra note __ at 143 (“The inescapable conclusion is that the Supreme Court has considered 
the matter settled and has no interest in crowding its docket with cases that merely repeat what has already 
been decided.”). 
67
 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008). 
68
  See Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2790-2805 (majority opinion of Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, Alito, Thomas, and 
Kennedy); Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2822 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) (“The 
question presented by this case is not whether the Second Amendment protects a ‘collective right’ or an 
‘individual right.’ Surely it protects a right that can be enforced by individuals.”).  See also Glenn H. 
Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Heller’s Future in the Lower Courts, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 2035, 2035 
(“What Heller is most notable for is its complete and unanimous rejection of the “collective rights” 
interpretation that for nearly seventy years held sway with pundits, academics, and--most significantly--
lower courts.” 
repudiation of Spitzer’s theory cripples his overall thesis, and well establishes the maxim 
that one should think carefully before committing hyperbole in the written word.69 
B. Causation, Causation, Causation 
Aside from the rather unfortunate example of the Second Amendment, Spitzer has 
little evidence of allegedly “harmful” scholarship infecting court decisions.70  Instead 
Chapters three, four and five are all largely critical of executive branch reliance on faulty 
scholarship.71  The problem with these chapters is that while the executive branch 
partially relied upon the scholarship Spitzer derides as faulty, it’s again quite naïve to 
think that this scholarship actually caused any of these actions. 
First, it’s worth wondering about the influence of law reviews altogether.  Spitzer 
himself notes that law reviews are cited less frequently by courts and are utilized less 
frequently by practicing lawyers than ever before.72 
Moreover, even if law reviews were influential, a political scientist like Spitzer 
should certainly understand that the actual effect of a law review article on the behavior 
or decisions of judges, let alone other governmental actors, is quite limited.  Political 
scientists have spent years building the literature of the attitudinal model, which argues 
that judges decide cases on the basis of their political preferences, not any deep 
understanding or analysis of the law, and then add the legal discussion as a justification 
                                                 
69
  Moreover, while Spitzer is quite critical of law school and legal practices insistence that there are two 
sides to most issues, some of that equivocation would have served him well in writing this book.  It’s hard 
to imagine a lawyer of an ability ever making the sweeping claims of correctness Spitzer makes here. 
70
  Note that this fact alone greatly limits the amount of “harm” that any of these theories caused, as courts 
have the final say on the constitution, not members of the justice department or the president’s staff.  
Moreover, as Spitzer himself notes, courts have explicitly or implicitly rejected the theories in Chapters 
three and four, see SPITZER, supra note __ at 60-61 and 119-21. 
71
  Chapter Three addresses George H.W. Bush’s constitutional claim to an inherent line item veto.  Chapter 
Four covers George W. Bush’s claims to expansive executive privilege.  Chapter Five includes a critique of 
John Ashcroft’s position on the Second Amendment.    
72
 SPITZER, supra note __ at 47, 180-81. 
for their pre-determined decision.73  Under the attitudinal theory judges make up their 
minds first based on political preference, and then fill in the blanks later on.  Under this 
model of judicial decision-making the most you could say about law review articles in a 
judicial opinion is that they are used as support for decisions that were already made. 
If this is the case for judges (as the attitudinal model suggests), it has to be doubly 
true for political actors like white house or justice department officials.  It is a historical 
fact that lawyers in the first Bush White House argued for an inherent constitutional line 
item veto and in the second Bush White House for uniquely powerful unitary executive 
and commander-in-chief powers.  It is also true that in justifying these claims the White 
House used law review articles, among other areas of support.  I’ll even grant that it may 
be true that both Bush White Houses were wrong on the merits (although that’s a much 
harder question). 
It is untrue and quite naïve, however, to assert that a law review article “caused” 
either Bush White House to make these claims.  In fact, Spitzer himself recognizes that 
the George W. Bush brief in support of expanded presidential powers “reveals an 
administration that had already decided on the direction in which it wished to proceed 
and had gone in search of a post hac legal justification to legitimize conclusions already 
drawn.”74    
These decisions were made politically, and the law review support was added as a 
post hac defense.  If the law review articles cited by Spitzer had been rejected by peer 
review, would these White House efforts been stillborn?  Hardly.  The lawyers at issue 
                                                 
73
  The attitudinal model was first laid out in JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993).  See also JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).  
74
 SPITZER, supra note __ at 122. 
would have gone forward with what they had as support, regardless.  The law reviews 
were at best icing on the cake.  More likely they were a cynical gloss added to support 
decisions made politically, not on the basis of the actual “truth” or “correctness” of the 
constitutional theories presented.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 “Saving the Constitution from Lawyers” does raise some challenging issues about 
the nature of the law professoriate, and its interaction with student-edited law reviews.  
Spitzer taps into the variety of issues that come with the hybrid nature of law schools: we 
are professional schools that also produce serious scholarly research, and sometimes the 
training and qualifications for each are not coextensive.   
That said, Spitzer fails at his main goal of proving a danger to the U.S. 
Constitution from faulty scholarship.  Spitzer may have a legitimate disagreement over 
the scholarship he pillories, but it is too much for him to prove that the scholarship is so 
wrong as to be dangerous.75 
                                                 
75
  So, rest easy America, the Constitution will be fine. 
